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JOSEPH RUNZO 
WORLD-VIEWS AND THE EPISTEMIC 
FOUNDATIONS OF THEISM1 
Epistemological issues have inevitably been perennial issues for theism. For 
any claim to have insight into the nature and acts of the divine requires some 
sort of substantiation. And the appeal to faith typically made to meet this 
demand is often unconvincing. This raises a fundamental question: what 
could constitute proper grounds for theistic belief? In attempting to anwser 
this question, we will need to address the underlying epistemic issue of what 
justifies commitment to any world-view. 
Tertullian proposed the provocative if enigmatic notion that, at least 
regarding the Christ-event, 'just because it is absurd, it is to be believed', 
and a key element of Augustine's theology is his admonition to the faithful 
to 'Believe in order that you may understand; Unless you shall believe, you 
shall not understand. 
' 
In the High Middle Ages, the debate over the primacy 
of reason or revelation found a champion of the via media in Thomas Aquinas. 
With the shattering of unified church authority in the West during the 
Reformation and the resultant rise of the emphasis on the powers of human 
reason in the Enlightenment, we find Locke, Hume, Kant, and others 
espousing the view that 'if we distrust human reason, we have now no other 
principle to lead us into religion'.2 At the one extreme are fideists, at the 
other evidentialists. On the one side the view that it is a grave error to allow 
reason to supplant faith, and on the other that faith without evidence is blind 
and, so, intellectually disreputable. As is often the case with radically 
opposed views, both sides have something important to say about the proper 
foundations of theism. 
In this paper, I will argue that faith and reason form two mutually 
essential epistemic foundations of theism. For while faith without evidence 
may be no more than a pacifier for the mind, requiring conclusive evidence 
for theism apart from faith is an invitation to mental anorexia. 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Cambridge University and King's College, University 
of London. I wish to thank those faculties for their helpful discussion. I am especially indebted to Bill 
Alston, Brian Hebblethwaite, Phil Quinn, Bruce Russell, and Keith Ward for their insightful comments. 
Support for this paper was provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities through a Summer 
Stipend Fellowship. 2 David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Pt. I. 
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I 
The question, 'What constitutes proper grounds for religious belief?', can 
mean several different things. First, we might be asking a theological 
question, or we might be asking an epistemologial question. Thus, we 
might be asking what would constitute religiously adequate reasons for 
religious belief- e.g. scriptural authority, personal revelation, adhering to 
the magisterium of the church. In contrast, we might be asking whether 
religious belief is epistemologically justified, justified when judged strictly in 
terms of its cognitive status. I am concerned here with the 'proper' grounds 
for religious belief in the latter, epistemic sense. I will make a brief comment 
at the end about considerations of theological adequacy for religious belief. 
Second, at the outset we need to distinguish between two senses in which 
a belief might be epistemologically justified: one can epistemically evaluate 
either the process by which beliefs are acquired, or the person acquiring the 
beliefs. One way to assess the epistemic status of beliefs is in terms of the 
likelihood that the belief is true given the means by which the belief was 
acquired. On this approach, sudden hunches and desperate guesses are 
epistemically weak, while conclusions drawn from carefully controlled 
chemical analysis are epistemically strong, because the latter and not the 
former are based on belief-forming procedures (doxastic practices) which are 
generally favourable for producing true beliefs. However, the epistemic 
status of beliefs can also be assessed normatively in terms of the believer's 
intellectual obligations. In this sense, a person is epistemically justified in a 
belief if he or she has not violated any intellectual obligations. On this sort 
of assessment, a person who makes a wild guess at the answer to 
a 
problem 
in chemistry is not justified (even if he is right), and the careful, painstaking 
chemist is justified (even if she is mistaken), because we know full well that 
wild guesses are unlikely to produce correct answers in chemistry, while the 
chemist has no reason to think that her careful scientific methodology is likely 
to produce incorrect results. Or, 
to contrast the two senses concomitantly, a 
child's belief while at Disneyland in the existence of Mickey Mouse may not 
be epistemically justified, since a fantasy setting is not an appropriate context 
for the reliability of standard doxastic practices. But the child may be 
epistemically justified, having no reason not to trust what are otherwise 
reliable sources of knowledge 
- his parents' word, his perceptions, etc. 
In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with the normative epistemic 
justification of theistic belief-namely, with whether the believer ought to 
hold the beliefs he or she does. Our central question then is not, what would 
make the beliefs of the theist epistemically justified, but what would make the 
theist epistemically justified in his or her beliefs? 
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II 
This is a trenchant problem because all too often theists appear to be building 
a Chartres for the mind on cognitive sand. This enables an Ambrose Bierce 
satirically to define faith as 
' 
belief without evidence in what is told by one 
who speaks without knowledge, of things without parallel'.1 And serious 
scepticism about the cognitive value of apparently unsupported religious 
belief has led to evidentialist approaches to theism. 
An evidentialist might attack the theist as being insufficiently justified in 
his or her beliefs. Or an evidentialist might defend the theist on the grounds 
that their belief is justified according to evidentialist standards. In either case, 
the evidentialist holds that to be epistemically justified, the theist's beliefs 
must be rational, and to be rational they must be supported by evidence. 
Prima facie this requirement seems reasonable. 
There are two ways of trying to rebut the evidentialist account of theistic 
belief. One way is that of the fideist: namely to deny the evidentialist's 
assumption that it is proper to use reason to judge faith statements. We will 
consider that line of approach later. Another way is to accept the evi? 
dentialist's assumption that faith statements are subject to rational assess? 
ment, but to deny the epistemological principles on which evidentialism is 
itself based. This is the tack which Alvin Plantinga pursues in the powerful 
attack against evidentialism which he has recently developed. An assessment 
of Plantinga's position will provide a helpful entry into the wider question 
of the epistemic foundations of theism. 
Plantinga suggests that 'classical foundationalism' is the principal basis 
for evidentialism. He argues that classical foundationalism is incoherent, and 
hence that the evidentialist account of religious belief should be abandoned. 
First, then, what is foundationalism? In general, a foundationalist argues 
that while some of our beliefs are held on the basis of other beliefs, some of 
our beliefs must be held immediately, and not based on other beliefs. For 
otherwise there would either be an infinite regress or a vicious circularity 
within our beliefs. Paradigm examples of these foundational, or basic beliefs, 
are given: e.g. 
' 
i ? i = o' and 'I have a headache'. A normative thesis is 
then added explaining what makes a belief properly basic, i.e. a belief one can 
hold as basic without violating fundamental epistemic principles. And, 
finally, the foundationalist argues that what makes it rational to hold a belief 
1 
Bierce, Ambrose, The Devil's Dictionary. 2 An excellent account of evidentialism and its historical background is given by Nicholas Wolterstorff 
in his Introduction to Faith and Rationality : Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 5-7, and his article, 'Can 
Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?', in the same volume, pp. 136-40. However, 
Wolterstorff sometimes writes as if evidentialism inherently undermines theism, referring, e.g. to 
'the Evidentialist's Challenge to Theism'. But Locke, and contemporary philosophers like Richard 
Swinburne, defend theism precisely on evidentialist grounds. 
2 RES 25 
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is that it is either itself a properly basic belief, or that it is appropriately based 
on a set of beliefs which themselves either are or eventually lead to properly 
basic beliefs. 
What makes a belief properly basic? Obviously we cannot properly believe 
just anything without support from our other beliefs : my belief that i 
? i = o 
is a properly basic belief; if I had a dream and came to believe that I am 
(unwittingly) as musically talented as Beethoven, that belief would not be 
properly basic for me, even if it were true. The classical foundationalist view, 
as Plantinga delineates it, is the conjunction of the ancient and medieval 
variety of foundationalism with modern foundationalism. On both versions, 
self-evident propositions are properly basic. To this, ancient and medieval 
foundationalists add propositions which are 
' 
evident to the senses 
' 
; modern 
foundationalists add propositions which are incorrigible 
- 
experiential 
beliefs about which we cannot possibly be mistaken, such as beliefs about our 
current, conscious mental states. Hence, a classical foundationalist is anyone 
who holds the following principle, call it CF: 
CF - a proposition P is properly basic for S at time /, if and only if P is either self 
evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible, for S at /. 
Plantinga attacks this criterion, CF, for proper basicality by arguing that 
it is self-referentially incoherent. He suggests that CF is itself basic within the 
classical foundationalist's noetic structure.1 But then CF would have to be 
properly basic on the criteria given in CF. CF is obviously not evident to the 
senses, and, Plantinga suggests, it is neither self-evident nor incorrigible. 
Hence classical foundationalism is self-defeating. There are several diffi? 
culties with this line of reasoning. One point to note is that classical found? 
ationalism is not the only possible epistemological basis for evidentialism. As 
an alternative, an evidentialist could take a coherentist position. (Recently, 
Plantinga has addressed coherentism as a basis for an evidentialist objection 
to theism.)2 Yet even if theistic belief can be properly basic on some alterna? 
tive account, classical foundationalism still must be considered as the typical 
and perhaps most promising basis for evidentialism. 
However, two other, more significant points expose an important under 
1 See Alvin Plantinga, Is Belief in God Rational?', in Rationality and Belief, ed. C. F. Delaney (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), p. 25, and 'Reason and Belief in God', in Faith and 
Rationality, p. 60. 2 
In general, I do not think that coherentism is viable. But even taking coherentism as a basis for the 
evidentialist objection to regarding theistic beliefs as basic, I think Plantinga rightly suggests that 'the 
question is whether the theist's belief in God can plausibly be thought to cohere with his corrected doxastic 
system. Could a theist be such that if he were an honest and careful truth seeker, unmoved by greed, fear, 
anger, lust, desire for comfort, and their like, he would still believe that there is such a person as God, 
and believe that this proposition has greater chance of being true than any of its competitors?... there 
seems... not the slightest reason to think that he could not '. (' Coherentism and the Evidentialist Objection 
to Belief in God,' Rationality, Religious Belief, and Moral Commitment : New Essays in the Philosophy of Religion, 
ed. Robert Audi and William J. Wainwright [Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986], 
P- I33-) 
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lying issue. One problem with Plantinga's assessment of classical found? 
ationalism is that the classical foundationalist might not hold CFas basic. The 
foundationalist might have reasons for CF, even if those reasons are not 
expressed. Or, to give reasons, the foundationalist could invert the order of 
reasoning I suggest above as a defense of foundationalism and construct 
reasons for CF on the basis of paradigmatic examples of beliefs which are 
taken to be properly basic and are either evident to the senses, incorrigible, 
or self-evident. In either case, CF will not itself be basic, and so need not be 
properly basic. 
On the other hand, even if CF must be basic for the classical foundationalist, 
Plantinga has not shown that the position is self-referentially incoherent. For 
how do we know that CF is not self-evident for the foundationalist? To see 
the force of these last two points, let us look at Plantinga's own account of 
the epistemic status of religious beliefs. 
in 
While rejecting the evidentialist account of justified belief primarily by 
arguing against classical foundationalism, Plantinga himself defends a 
broadly foundationalist notion that theistic beliefs can be 'properly basic'. 
There are several stages to Plantinga's argument. First he holds that belief 
in God is basic for the believer: 
the mature believer, the mature theist, does not typically accept belief in God 
tentatively, or hypothetically, or until something better comes along. Nor, I think, 
does he accept it as a conclusion from other things he believes ; he accepts it as basic, 
as a part of the foundations of his noetic structure. The mature theist commits himself 
to belief in God; this means that he accepts belief in God as basic.1 
More specifically, Plantinga argues that certain sorts of beliefs, for which the 
theist need not have any reasons, about God's relation to the world, can be 
properly basic. The sorts of beliefs Plantinga suggests as properly basic are, 
e.g. 
' 





is to be thanked and praised'.2 The beliefs, if true, will in turn entail that 
God exists. Finally, Plantinga supports the proper basicality of these beliefs 
by arguing that they are comparable to ordinary perceptual beliefs, memory 
beliefs and beliefs ascribing mental states to other persons, which are clearly 




Is Belief in God Rational? ', p. 27. Sometimes Plantinga seems to be arguing, as here, that 
belief in God's existence is itself (properly) basic. As we shall see, he comes to hold the view that the belief 
that God exists rests on other theistic beliefs which are themselves properly basic. 2 
Plantinga, 'Reason and Belief in God', p. 81. Cf. 'On Taking Belief in God as Basic', Religious 
Experience and Religious Belief: Essays in the Epistemology of Religion, ed. Joseph Runzo and Craig K. Ihara 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 12-13. 3 
Plantinga, 'On taking Belief in God as Basic', pp. 10-14. 
2-2 
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For instance, consider (to use Plantinga's examples) the beliefs 'I see a 
tree', 'I had breakfast this morning', and 'That person is angry'. In the 
usual case, these are not the sorts of beliefs which we hold on the basis of 
other beliefs. As I gaze out of my study at our crape myrtle, I immediately 
form the belief that I see a tree ; as noon approaches, and I think back to my 
last meal, I immediately form the belief that I had an omelet for breakfast ; 
as I am confronted by the Dean exhibiting the contorted face and raised 
voice of anger behaviour, I immediately form the belief 
' 
That person is 
angry': these are properly basic beliefs. Being justified in believing that one 
sees a tree, had breakfast or that someone is angry, does not depend on having 
other beliefs as reasons - e.g. that objects with reddish bark and crenulated 
pink flowers are crape myrtle trees ; that there were two eggs in the refriger? 
ator last night, now there are none; that the Dean normally has a pallid 
pallor, not the blood-infused countenance which now confronts me. Simi? 
larly, the argument goes, a theist in prayer, or one awed by the precipitous 
ten thousand foot eastern wall of the Sierra Nevada, can properly believe, 
without inferring this from other beliefs as reasons, that 'God is to be 
thanked' or that 'God created all this.' 
Despite these proposed parallels, it might still seem implausible, just as the 
evidentialist suggests, that theistic belief could be properly basic if the theist 
really has no reasons for his or her beliefs. This objection might rest on a 
confusion. We should not confuse having reasons for a belief, B, with having 
reasons for the belief that B is basic. We should expect reasons for the higher 
level epistemological belief that a certain belief is basic. But what we are 
considering here is only the claim that we should not expect reasons of 
someone, whose theistic beliefs are basic, for why they hold those beliefs.1 
Even more important, to say that one does not need reasons for basic theistic 
beliefs is not to say that these beliefs are groundless.2 Perceptual beliefs, 
memory beliefs, and beliefs ascribing mental states to others are themselves 
only properly basic when grounded in the appropriate circumstances : look? 
ing directly out of the open window at our crape myrtle ; bringing to mind 
my memory of my most recent meal; being sharply attentive to the Dean's 




precisely when the experiential circumstances under which they are 
acquired constitute sufficient grounds for basicality. And in fact a claim like 
'God is to be thanked and praised' is typically based on experiential 
1 
Plantinga himself does not deny that there could not be adequate reasons for those theistic beliefs 
which an individual takes as basic, only that there need not be adequate (or any) reasons for fundamental 
theistic claims. He thinks that some version of the Ontological Argument provides adequate reasons for 
belief in God's existence. (See The Nature of Necessity [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974], ch. X, 
especially pp. 213-17.) Against this, I argue below that the theist must have basic theistic beliefs which 
are based on faith and cannot be based on reasons. 
2 See e.g. Plantinga, 'Reason and Belief in God', pp. 78 ff. and 'On Taking Belief in God as Basic,' 
pp. 12 ff. 
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grounds. Thus, a monotheist attending services in King's College Chapel, 
Cambridge, might bring this claim to mind upon hearing the choir, the 
words of the liturgy, gazing upon the soaring, transcendent fan vaulting, and 
so forth. 
iv 
Monotheistic beliefs can be properly basic: one can be epistemically justified 
in holding theistic beliefs as basic, with no further beliefs as reasons, as long 
as one has appropriate grounds for those beliefs. But whereas Plantinga, for 
example, offers a primarily negative defence for holding that theistic beliefs 
can be basic, by attempting to show that 
' 
there is nothing contrary to reason 
or irrational in so doing',1 I think it can be shown why the theist can have 
appropriate grounds for holding some theistic beliefs as basic, and thus it can 
be shown why some theistic beliefs are properly basic. Moreover, this explan? 
ation will show that it is not only epistemologically proper but necessary for 
some theistic beliefs to be basic. Thus a strong positive defence of the proper 
basicality of monotheistic belief can be given. At the same time, though, this 
defence will indicate not only why the evidentialist position per se fails, but 
why the evidentialist's argument is initially plausible. 
To start, consider again Plantinga's method for supporting the proper 
basicality of theistic beliefs. He first suggests that certain sorts of beliefs are 
properly basic for the theist, and then uses those beliefs as paradigms of 
properly basic beliefs to determine general criteria for proper basicality.2 
Now as Plantinga himself acknowledges, different people will have quite 
different beliefs that they take to be properly basic: 
there is no reason to assume in advance that everyone will agree on the examples. 
The Chrisdan will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and 
rational; if he doesn't accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will 
conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly so. Followers of Bertrand Russell 
and Madelyn Murray O'Hare may disagree, but... the Christian community is 
responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs.3 
The crux of the matter is that a belief is properly basic only for some 
individual or community of individuals. Put another way, a belief is only 
properly basic relative to some system of belief, some particular world-view.4 
In the first place, a proposition will not even be a candidate for belief unless, 
in Jamesian terms, it is a 'live option', and a potential belief cannot be a live 
option unless it is at least semantically meaningful to the individual in 
question, meaningful on their conceptual schema. In the second place, even 
1 
Plantinga, 'Is Belief in God Rational?', p. 27. 2 
Plantinga, 'Is Belief in God Properly Basic?', in Nous, (1981), 50. 3 Ibid. p. 46. 4 I will use the term 'world-view' to denote all the cognitive elements, including beliefs, but also 
concepts, laws of logic, and so on, which the mind brings to experience. 
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among beliefs which are live options for the same group of individuals, what 
is a basic belief for one individual may be a non-basic belief for another 
individual in the group. Consequently, a procedure like Plantinga's for 
defending the proper basicality of theistic beliefs, by first identifying certain 
theistic beliefs as properly basic, is restricted on two counts: it purposively 
ignores those outside the theistic world-view for whom the theist's basic 
beliefs are not properly basic, and it does not account for those ostensibly 
inside the theistic schema who would deny that the particular theistic beliefs 
which are identified are properly basic beliefs. 
In general, these limitations were already evident in the way classical 
foundationalism was assessed. As part of his argument that classical found? 
ationalism is self-referentially incoherent, Plantinga suggests that CF is not 
self-evident but that it must be basic for the classical foundationalist. Many 
will agree with Plantinga that the classical foundationalist's principle CF is 
not self-evident. But on Plantinga's own account that is irrelevant. For what 
we must ask is whether CF is self-evident and so properly basic for the 
foundationalist. Similarly, whether or not the foundationalist holds CF on 
the basic of other beliefs will depend on the structure of the individual 
classical foundationalist's world-view. On Plantinga's own account, these are 
matters which cannot be settled a priori, but rather inductively, on the basis 
of what in fact are properly basic propositions for the individual. And insofar 
as it turns out that classical foundationalism is self-referentially coherent and 
accepted on its own grounds, theistic beliefs like 
' 
God created all this 
' 
will 
not be properly basic on that view. 
Specifically regarding theism, to see the limitations of an account such as 
Plantinga's against external criticisms, consider how world-views which are 
alternatives to theism will have to be assessed. A-theistic beliefs (whether 
religious or non-religious) and agnostic beliefs will have exactly the same 
prima facie claim to proper basicality vis-?-vis the relevant world-views, as 
theistic beliefs will have on the world-view which the theist holds. Turning 
to internal criticisms, two observations should be made. First, it is implausible 
to suppose that, within the enormous spectrum of traditions comprising 
monotheism, the same set, or even very nearly the same set, of beliefs will be 
properly basic. Monotheists are diverse as Ramanuja, Al-Gazali, 
Maimonides (or the authors of the ?ohar), Thomas Aquinas, and 
Schleiermacher do not hold the same basic theistic beliefs. And narrowing 
the scope of theism further will not help. For example, Christianity alone is 






more so, there is no single set of beliefs which con? 
stitute 'the' one definitive set of basic (much less properly basic) Christian 
beliefs. Second, no matter how theism is construed, even if 'theism' is 
narrowed to some strand of Christianity, say Calvinism or Thomism, which 
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theistic beliefs will be properly basic beliefs will depend on the circumstances 
and particular world-view of each individual within the tradition in 
question.1 
v 
What we are looking for, then, is a broader epistemological theory which 
offers a reply to evidentialism but explains why theistic beliefs are properly 
basic, and so accounts for these external and internal objections. Now, since 
we have a surer understanding of the epistemic status of our everyday sensory 
beliefs than we do of religious beliefs, one approach would be to consider 
more closely how the proper basicality of theistic beliefs might be comparable 
to that of ordinary perceptual beliefs. A major proponent of this approach 
is William Alston. 
Alston argues for the strong thesis that religious experience can provide 
direct justification for theistic beliefs about how God's nature and activities 
manifest themselves in the lives of humans. These 'manifestation' beliefs 
which Alston focuses on, that 'God will provide for his people', that 'God 
speaks to us through the Bible' and so on, are the same type of theistic belief 
which Plantinga regards as properly basic. First considering ordinary sense 
perception, Alston argues that we are prima facie justified in our sensory beliefs 
if those beliefs arise from perceptual experiences which seem to us to present 
the fact that is believed. That is, we are justified insofar as we have no 
adequate reason for supposing that our beliefs formed in this manner on the 
basis of sense perception, are unreliable. Alston then argues that religious 
beliefs about God's manifestations, formed on the basis of religious experi? 
ence, are similarly justified-justified unless there is sufficient reason to 
believe otherwise. In the case of 
religious experiences, the experiences of 
others but also scripture, tradition, and so on, would provide potential 
reasons to believe otherwise.2 
Alston concedes that religious experiences, as a basis for belief formation, 
are commonly thought to be discredited vis-?-vis ordinary sense experiences 
because the former, unlike the latter, (i) offer no standard checks for 
accuracy, (2) offer no basis for the prediction of future events, (3) are not 
found universally among normal adults, and (4) are objectified by different 
1 For instance, in 'In Search of the Foundations of Theism', (in Faith and Philosophy, n, 4 [October 
1985]), Philip Quinn points out that propositions like 'God made all this' could start as properly basic, 
entailing that God exists, and then the theist's noetic structure evolve such that 'God exists' becomes 
properly basic and propositions like 'God created all this' are believed on the basis of entailment 
(pp. 478-9) 2 See e.g. Alston, 'Christian Experience and Christian Belief,' in Faith and Rationality, pp. 112-13. 
Terrence Penelhum argues for a qualified version of this type of argument, which he calls a Parity 
Argument in God and Skepticism: A Study in Skepticism and Fideism (Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel, 1983), 
see esp. Ch. 7. 
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conceptual sch?mas.1 Against this Alston contends that (a) there is no reason 
to think that features like (i)-(4) must be criteria of reliability for every 
doxastic practice, and (b) we should actually expect (i)-(4) to be absent 
from religious experiences. For theistic experiences putatively involve a being 
who is so 
'wholly other' that humans are unable to grasp the regularities of 
His behaviour or to achieve more than the sketchiest idea of His nature, and 
who additionally places limitations on when His presence will be evident. 
The crucial element in these suggested differences (i)-(4) between per? 
ceptual and religious doxastic practices is actually (4), the effect of differences 
of conceptual schema on experience. True, the 'wholly otherness' of God 
could, in part, explain (2) 
- 
why past religious experiences provide little 
predictive understanding of God's actions. But features (i)-(3) of religious 
experiences most fundamentally stem from differences among the conceptual 
sch?mas of those who have religious experiences. As we shall see, such 
differences of world-view, not only among the world religions, but within each 
of the world religions, are the underlying cause of (3) 
- the lack of univers? 
ality of religious experiences 
- 
and explain (1), the absence of standard 
checks for the accuracy of experiential religious truth-claims. 
First, the manner in which perceptual beliefs vary among perceivers is 
more like variations in religious belief than Alston allows. Consider scientific 
beliefs, which once appeared potentially the most reliably invariant of our 
experiential beliefs. Norwood Hanson argues that all seeing is 'theory laden' 
and that the scientific observation of an entity X is 
' 
shaped by prior knowl? 
edge of X\ and Thomas Kuhn builds a persuasive case that scientific 
paradigms are not only constitutive of science, 'they are constitutive of 
nature as well' such that scientists with incompatible world-views literally 
'live in different worlds'.2 On this account, different scientific views do not 
just result in different interpretations of the same data available to all 
inquirers, differing theories actually result in differing observational data. 
The same effect of world-views on the 'data' of experience can be seen in 
cases of common perception. One person hears the two great opening chords 





; one savours a vintage port, another tastes a heavy, sweet wine ; one 
person stands at streamside and sees the delicate cast of a no. 16 Pale 
Morning Dun on a 5X tippet, another watches someone waving a fishing 
pole back and forth. What we perceive is inextricably determined, in part, 
by the conceptual resources we bring to our experiences. The musically 
illiterate, gustatorily impoverished or athletically allergic not only cannot 
experience in the same way, but cannot experience the same things, as the 
1 See Alston, 'Religious Experience as a Ground of Religious Belief, in Religious Experience and Religious 
Belief, p. 44, and 'Plantinga's Epistemology of Religious Belief, in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James Tomberlin 
and Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 306-8. 2 Norwood Hanson, Patterns of Discovery : An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science (Cambridge : 
Cambridge University Press, 1958), p. 19 and Thomas S.Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 109 and pp. 115-16. 
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aesthete and the educated. Standing in the Place de la Concorde in Paris 
today, a newly arrived Australian bushman could not perceive what you or 
I would perceive. And even in the same culture, four-year-olds do not see the 
same world forty-year-olds see. 
But this is no different in kind from the differences in the religious per? 
ceptions of the theologian and the theologically naive, the Shiite funda? 
mentalist and the Dutch Calvinist fundamentalist, the first-century Christian 
and the modern Anglican 
- 
or for that matter of the naturalist and the theist. 
So while they do differ, religious experiences and ordinary perceptual 
experiences are no different in kind in terms of their objectification by 
different sch?mas (feature [4]) and, consequently, their lack of universality 
(feature [3] in Alston's analysis). For in general, to experience X is to 
experience X as something Y, whether what one is experiencing is a religious 
or a 
non-religious state of affairs.1 And the possibility of experiencing some? 
thing as Y is determined by the percipient's conceptual resources. That is to 
say, all experience is conceptualized by the percipient's world-view. This is 
why religious experiences are not universal, why even people in the same 
tradition often have quite different religious experiences, for even here there 
will be considerable variation among individuals' conceptual resources. And 
this is why the theist but not the naturalist might well experience nature as 
the creation of God, an experience which could then ground the basic belief 
that 'God created all this'. 
Second, the salient role of differences of conceptual schema can also be 
seen if we consider the underlying epistemic issue, most directly raised by ( 1 ), 
of the justification of our beliefs. Generally, perceptual beliefs appear more 
justified than religious beliefs. After all, so the argument goes, typically any 
'normal' observer can check the perceptual claims of another person. In 
contrast, we are usually told that the experiential religious claims of another 
can be checked, if at all, only if one understands those religious claims from 
the perspective of the tradition in question. So to check the monotheist's 
experiential claims effectively, one must at least entertain theistic assumption 
about how God might be manifesting Himself. Such a checking procedure 
is circular. But this circularity does not tell against the epistemic justification 
of religious truth-claims. 
The truth-claims of every doxastic practice can only be assessed by 
assuming the basic reliability of the practice. Thus for perception, I can only 
check the reliability of any particular perceptual belief by checking it against 
other perceptual beliefs, thereby assuming the general reliability of my 
doxastic perceptual practice.2 Even a doxastic practice like theoretical 
1 I give an extended argument for this analysis of perception in 'The Propositional Structure of 
Perception', American Philosophical Quarterly, xiv (July 1977) and 'The Radical Conceptualization of 
Perceptual Experience', American Philosophical Quarterly, xix (July 1982). 2 Alston makes a similar point 
- but does not draw the general conclusion I do about the role of 
conceptual sch?mas 
- in 
'Religious Experience as a Ground of Religious Belief, pp. 41-2, and 'Christian 
Experience and Christian Belief, pp. 117-18. 
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physics cannot be checked by assuming the reliability of only other doxastic 
practices, such as perception. Phenomena postulated by theoretical physics 
- 
e.g. black holes, the weak and strong atomic forces, or the 'big bang' 
- 
can 
only be checked on the basis of the assumed reliability of both the more 
general theories of physics in which these specific theoretical entities are 
embedded, and the assumed reliability of the theorized relationship between 
perception and the specific as well as the more general theories being em? 
ployed. And, since different theories result in different observational data, 
there are no neutral perceptual data against which to check the reliability of 
a scientific theory. The reliability of our beliefs, then, can only be assessed 
internally to the relevant doxastic practice(s). 
The reason for this is that the only access which one has to a particular 
subject matter, whether objects of sense perception or of religious experience, 
is, by definition, one's own relevant doxastic practice. And this holds true even 
when one attempts to check the reliability of beliefs zVztersubjectively and not 
just innersubjectively. For the agreement or disagreement of others with our 
beliefs is only meaningful if we share concepts with them about the object of 
belief and about the proper procedures for checking those beliefs. (Thus, the 
notion of a 'normal' observer is relative to a world-view - according to their 
own world-views, an Australian bushman and a French historian are each 
'normal' perceivers as they stand in the Place de la Concorde, yet their 
perceptions are very different.) And once again, because of the essential 
connection between our world-views and the nature of experience, theistic 
belief is no different in kind here, in its epistemic justification, than 
perceptual or memory belief. 
There is a further point. Even the relatively high-order epistemological 
issue of the justification of our doxastic practices themselves is indelibly tied 
to our world-views. Individual beliefs derive their justification from the 
doxastic practice in which they are embedded. A person is justified in 
conforming to a doxastic practice, in turn, if he or she has no adequate 
reasons for thinking that their belief-forming practice is unreliable. As a 
result, an individual's world-view, whether religious or non-religious, affects 
the epistemological justification of their beliefs in two ways, (a) The very 
nature of experiences which must provide the adequate grounding for belief 
will be in part determined by the individual's world-view. And additionally, 
(b), the individual's own world-view will in part determine via experience 
whether there are any reasons against supposing that their world-view 
itself incorporates acceptable doxastic practices. Clearly then, epistemic 
justification is person-relative, varying from world-view to world-view, for 
the theist and non-theist alike. 
Where does this leave us? One is justified in holding theistic beliefs as basic 
beliefs if ont has adequate grounds for one's beliefs. And religious experience 
could serve as grounds for theistic beliefs as basic beliefs. But as we now see, 
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that will depend on the acceptability of the theistic world-view itself. Since 
the adequacy of religious experience as grounds for religious belief is relative 
to the individual's world-view, to show that the theist is epistemically justi? 
fied, one must show how conforming to a theistic world-view could be 
justified vis-?-vis alternative world-views with their attendant, contrasting 
experiences as grounds for belief. 
VI 
When is one justified in accepting a theistic, as opposed to some other, world 
view? So far the discussion has assumed that the theist's beliefs involve truth 
claims about a divine reality, for which the theist is either epistemically 
justified or not. Perhaps this is a mistake. We can avert the problems of 
epistemic justification, as well as any evidentialist challenge to theism, if we 
simply deny that it is proper to use reason to assess religious statements. 
In this vein, D. Z. Phillips has argued that 'knowledge of God is not 
theoretical knowledge : it is not a matter of coming to know more about 
anything'.1 Thus, Phillips holds that disputes about God between believers 
and non-believers are not 
' 




to say that religious 
pictures must refer to some object... that they must describe matters of 
fact... distorts the character of religious belief'.2 And Don Cupitt has argued 
that 'so far as we can tell, there is no objective personal God', and thus that 
' 
there cannot be any religious interest in any supposed extra-religious reality 
of God'. Cupitt concludes, 'It follows that religious language is not descrip? 
tive or metaphysical but intensely practical.'3 Phillips offers a descriptive 
analysis of religious language : if religion is properly understood as it is 
typically practised, we will see that reference to a transcendent, supernatural 
God is actually extraneous. Cupitt offers a stipulative analysis of religious 
language : we ought to reinterpret religious discourse to eliminate traditional 
reference to an external, objective deity, and instead emphasize religious 
values and spirituality. But while reaching different views about the nature 
of traditional religious discourse, both Phillips and Cupitt hold that theo? 
logical realism impedes or distorts true religiosity and argue for a non 
cognitivist understanding of religious language. 
A clear strength of these non-cognitivist approaches is their emphasis on 
religious spirituality over against excessively rationalistic religion. Yet how? 
ever important it may be to emphasize religious values, a non-cognitivist 
theism constitutes a different world-view than a cognitivist theism. Elsewhere 
1 D. Z. Phillips, The Concept of Prayer (New York: Shocken, 1966), p. 60. See also Faith and Philosophical 
Enquiry (New York: Shocken, 1971), p. 29. 2 
Phillips, Faith and Philosophical Enquiry, p. 1 and Religion Without Explanation (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 
1976), p- 150. 3 Don Cupitt, Taking Leave of God (New York: Crossroad, 1980), pp. 93, 96, and 164, respectively. 
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I have argued that theistic language can only be meaningful if it has cognitive 
content.1 Be this as it may, as the starting point for Cupitt's view recognizes, 
theological realism has traditionally been and still remains the stardard 
monotheistic position. Thus we still have the question, which I will continue 
to focus on, of what would constitute proper grounds for a cognitivist theism? 
VII 
To answer this question we will have to understand the role of faith vis-?-vis 
our world-views. Here we must distinguish between faith that, where faith is 
basically equivalent to the cognitive state of belief, and faith in, which is 
roughly equivalent to commitment or trust. These are not two different types 
of faith, but rather two aspects of faith, where faith in is inclusive offaith that. 
The fundamental notion of faith, faith in, denotes a disposition. For instance, 
to have faith in God is to be in a certain dispositional state 
- 
namely, to be 
disposed, under the right conditions, to act in certain ways, such as worship? 
ping or performing a supererogatory moral act, to acquire and/or intensify 
certain attitudes, e.g. selflessly loving one's fellow creatures, reverence 
toward God, and (assuming a cognitivist understanding of theism) to acquire 
certain sorts of beliefs, e.g. to have faith that God is just, and so on. Overall 
though, the most fundamental element of the dispositional state of faith that 
is the disposition to experience the world in a certain way. Thus, most 
fundamental to faith in God is the disposition to experience the world 
' 
theistically', to experience the world persistently as under God's providence. 
Faith in, then, is a complex dispositional state of commitment manifested in 
particular actions, attitudes, and beliefs, and essentially involving a type of 
experiencing-^. The strength of this commitment and the fact that genuine 
faith involves the whole person is marked by Tillich's designation of faith as 
being ultimately concerned.2 
Now, having faith in entails that the person of faith possesses a particular 
world-view. First, since it necessarily involves a type of experiencing-aj, faith 
in God, for example, entails holding those beliefs and possessing those con? 
ceptual resources which make a theistic experience of the world possible. 
Second, faith in includes dispositions to believe 
- 
e.g. to have faith that God 
has a certain nature, etc. Third, as ultimate concern involving the total 
person, a person's faith fundamentally delimits how he or she will experience 
1 See Reason, Relativism and God (London: Macmillan Press; New York: St Martin's 1986) pp. 175-81, 
Ch. 7 and pp. 234-6. I argue specifically against Phillip's non-cognitivist view in 'Religion, Relativism 
and Conceptual Schemas', The Heythrop Journal xxiv (1983). In the Hindu tradition, the great monotheist 
Ramanuja explicitly argues for a cognitivist view of religious language and Hindu scriptural tests. See 
Julius Lipner, The Face of Truth (London: Macmillan Press; Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), pp. 16 ff. 2 Paul Tillich, The Dynamics of Faith, p. 1. Cf. Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1951), Vol. 1, pp. 11-12. 
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and understand the world, thereby reinforcing the individual's current 
world-view with further, newly acquired, beliefs and concepts. 
Consequently, faith can be understood as essentially involving commit? 
ment to a world-view. Understood in this broad sense, faith is neither limited 
to mere belief in specific propositions, nor is it limited to religious contexts. 
Any person with a fundamental commitment to a world-view has, in the 
sense in which I am using this term, 'faith in\ 
VIII 
What then justifies a particular faith, a commitment to a world-view? Our 
actions can only be purposive in the context of an organized and stable world. 




of the world, providing 
coherence to the world we perceive, and so guiding our purposive activity. 
To be rational, therefore, requires attempting to achieve a coherent world 
view. But we do not choose world-views primarily on the basis of reason. For 
one thing, our world-view is first formed on trust within the social context 
of our childhood. Subsequently, in making alterations in our world-view, 




some portion of our previous world-view. And second, even when we do 
adopt a major change in our world-view, it is not principally rational 
reasoning, but faith, which decides the issue of which of two world-views, 
such as naturalism or monotheism, to adopt. We may initially become 
attracted by a new world-view in the light of evidence which is awkward, or 
cannot be parsimoniously accounted for, on our present world-view. But we 
acquire a new conception of the world (sometimes subtly and gradually) 
primarily on the basis of faith, and only afterwards find what we feel is 
conclusive evidence and argument to support that choice.1 
The reason we must make the choice of a world-view primarily on the 
basis of faith and not reasoning, is found in the difference between 'internal' 
and 'external' questions regarding world-views.2 Suppose we want to know 
whether God, or black holes, exist. We can only pursue such questions by 
presupposing a world-view on which it makes sense to speak of a black hole 
or of God. Thus, when we ask whether some specific state of affairs obtains, 
or is even possible, we are asking an 'internal question', a question which 
must be decided on the basis of some particular world-view (or set of related 
1 This is not to suggest that our beliefs are under our direct voluntary control. Rather, what we have 
in our power is the choice of actions or attitudes, such as studying information, getting a second opinion, 
or the willingness to listen to opposing ideas, which then contribute causally to our acquisition of beliefs. 
Thus, we have the ability to assume an attitude of trust, and to take an ultimate concern in, matters 
involving certain fundamental beliefs which come to form the foundational beliefs of the new world-view 
which we adopt. 2 On the distinction between internal and external questions see Rudolf Carnap, 'Empiricism, 
Semantics, and Ontology', in Semantics and the Philosophy of Language, ed. Leonard Linsky (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1952), p. 209. 
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world-views).1 On the other hand, when asking which world-view to choose, 
we are asking an 'external question' about the acceptability of one world 
view against alternative world-views. Now, since truth and falsity and what 
can serve as evidence in support of a belief, are internal matters about states 
of affairs, external questions about the acceptability of a world-view cannot 
be a matter of evidence or of the view itself being true or false. World-views 
themselves are neither true nor false, only more or less expedient. The 
choice of a world-view has to be settled on second-order pragmatic grounds 
- 
e.g. which view is the epistemically most powerful for acting in the world, 
which accounts for the most significant and the greatest variety of relevant 
experiences, and which solves what are taken to be the most significant 
prolems at issue. 
Recall that the evidentialist holds that the theist's beliefs must be rational, 
and to be rational they must be supported by evidence. The first half of this 
claim is correct; the second half is misleading. Theistic belief should be 
rejected if it is not both internally consistent and a rational choice among 
alternatives. But there can be no neutral, external evidence for theism itself. 
And while internal evidence is valuable for determining the appropriate 
strength of commitment to beliefs already held, or in changing individual 
beliefs, within a system, it cannot provide sufficient grounds for the choice of 
a world-view. Hence it is misguided to suppose that there could be indepen? 
dent, rationally convicting evidence 
- 
such as the ontological argument 
- for 
theism. Such 'evidence' is simply internal.2 As Anselm says of arguments for 
theistic belief, 
' 
I do not seek to understand that I may believe, but I believe 
in order to understand. For this also I believe, 
- that unless I believed, I 
should not understand. '3 This is major reason why theistic beliefs can be 
basic beliefs : the believer does not need evidence for them in part because 
there cannot be rationally convicting external evidence for theistic beliefs. 
In sum, we hold our world-view(s) principally on the basis of faith, not 
evidence. The question we are addressing has thus become: when is one 
1 While questions about whether some state of affairs obtains are internal to a world-view, different 
world-views can share some of the same conceptual resources, and if there is sufficient overlap, the same 
internal question of truth and falsity, or of possibility or probability, can be asked and assessed within 
those different but related world-views. See note 2 below. 
2 This does not mean that an argument for (or against) theism can only be applicable within one 
world-view. Many world-views will overlap, sharing certain conceptual resources. So a given theistic 
argument might be coherent within a number of sufficiently related world-views. But it will have no force 
with respect to world-views not sharing the requisite concepts and presuppositions. This applies to 
probabilistic arguments for or against theism. J. L. Mackie argues in The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982), that the balance of probability lies against theism. And Richard Swinburne 
argues in The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), that the truth of theism is more probable 
than not. But truth-claims are only probable vis-?-vis some assumed world-view or relevantly similar 
world-views. Hence probabilistic arguments also have limited force, since assessing the probability of 
theistic truth-claims is useless against criticism external to the world-views which are presupposed. 3 
Anselm, Proslogium in St Anselm : Basic Writings, trans. S. N. Deane (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1966), 
p. 7. 
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justified in accepting a theistic world-view, like any world-view, on faith? 
With this question we have come to the heart of the issue of what constitutes 
proper grounds for theistic belief. 
IX 
In his debate with Clifford on the 'ethics of belief, William James notes that 
' 
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion,... We 
must know the truth; and we must avoid error. 
a 
Regarding the second principle, 
we have already rejected evidentialism, insofar as it is construed in a strict 
Cliffordian manner, as insisting on always avoiding error to achieve epi? 
stemic justification. The first principle, 'seek the truth', can be taken to 
mean that one is epistemically justified in a belief or doxastic practice, unless 
one has adequate reason to cease believing that proposition or conforming 
to that practice. This is the view taken by Plantinga and Alston.2 I think 
that, depending on the beliefs at issue, one should sometimes adhere to the 
more restrictive principle, 'avoid error', and sometimes follow the more 
latitudinous principle, 'seek truth'. 
In the sciences, for example, as well as in many practical, every-day affairs, 
the wise course of action is to come to believe a truth-claim only when one 
has sufficient evidence: e.g. the medical researcher should be extremely 




is also potentially lethal. But there are special circumstances when one should 
follow the invitation to 'seek truth', to engage in a leap of faith, and believe 
without sufficient (prior) evidence. This is the rational course of action when, 
to use James's terminology, we are faced with a 'genuine option'-i.e. a 
choice that is conjointly live, forced, and momentous 
- 
which cannot be 
decided on the basis of evidence of argument, and which is potentially self 
verifying.3 Put in other terms, when we cannot decide a genuine option on 
intellectual grounds, the set of basic beliefs we acquire in virtue of coming to 
believe one side of the option can be a set of properly basic beliefs if it is 
potentially self-verifying. For then one has not violated the fundamental 
epistemic obligation to pursue truth and not believe just anything. 
It is irrational, of course, to choose that side of an option which one thinks 
one knows with certainty, or with a high degree of probability, to be false. 
But one will engage in a leap of faith in part because one believes that there 
is some reasonable probability that one's choice will turn out to be correct, 
despite the evidence currently available. The choice of a theistic world-view 
1 William James, 'The Will to Believe', in Essays on Faith and Morals (New York: Meridian, 1974), 
p. 48. 2 For Alston's view, see 'Religious Experience As a Ground of Religious Belief, pp. 35-43. On this 
view as taken by Thomas Reid and the parallel view of Nicholas Wolterstorff, see Wolterstorff, 
' 
Can 
Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?', pp. 163 and 168. 3 
James, 'The Will to Believe', p. 42. 
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will be a genuine option for those for whom it is a live option. And theistic 
belief is potentially self-verifying, because if God exists, faith in God makes 
possible an I-Thou relation with the divine, and makes possible the veri? 
fication of certain theistic expectations. Accordingly, a leap of theistic faith 
becomes a rational procedure, if one expects that by so doing one is more 
likely to come to a satisfactory understanding of the universe, than if one 
does not act as if theism were true. 
Here again we see why an evidentialist account" of theistic belief is mis? 
taken. Whenever the fundamental beliefs of a world-view, whether mono? 
theism or Marxism, a moral point of view or an a-moral point of view, are 
potentially self-verifying, a leap of faith is rationally justified. But those 
fundamental beliefs cannot be verified until one has already committed oneself 
to being engaged in that faith stance, until one is willing, e.g. to take the 
moral point of view, or to consider the world as under the providence of God. 
In this context, faith in is a pre-condition for substantiating our beliefs, since 
verification, like evidence, is internal to the world-view to which one is 
already committed. 
x 
This shows that the initial leap of theistic faith can be rationally justified, but 
could there be grounds for thinking that it is the best choice? after all, the 
leap of faith against theism can also be justified, since presumably it too is 
potentially self-verifying. To answer this, let us consider the kinds of grounds 
used to make choices among alternative views in the sciences. 
If a physicist in the early part of this century were trying to decide whether 
to accept an Einsteinian conception of space and time, the issue would not 
be, 'Is the Einsteinian account true?' To put the question this way would 
be to pose an internal question which presupposes the intelligibility of an 
Einsteinian world-view, for after all, from a Newtonian point of view, the 
Einsteinian account would appear false. The issue to be addressed is the 
pragmatic question of whether the new Einsteinian conception seems to solve 
what are regarded as the most pressing current puzzles, has the greater scope 
for future 
explanation, etc. 





view of, say, the origin of the universe, as contrasted with 
'the false' view of naturalism. Rather, the appropriate sort of considerations 
would be whether one thinks that the meaning of life, or morality, or the 
presence of beauty in the universe can best be explained in terms of 
the existence of a God. Of course, such valuations will vary according to the 
individual's own world-view. But while the evaluation of the degree, or lack, 
of success of monotheism in resolving those problems will vary, these prag? 
matic critera for assessing the acceptability of a theistic world-view will 
provide general trans-schema criteria 
- 
among sufficiently related world 
views - for the epistemic justification of the initial theistic leap of faith. 
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As a result, theistic faith can be objective. Not only will theistic truth 
claims be subject to interschematic checking procedures, but to the extent 
that theistic faith is pragmatically expedient for the individual, the mono? 
theistic option will have a strong claim to the individual's adherence, since 
it will then be not only live, but pragmatic vis-?-vis the alternatives con? 
sidered. Of course, such tests for objectivity only apply among world-views 
which share the relevant concepts. But that is how objectivity functions in 
any field of inquiry. Thus in the sciences, the checks against proceeding 
'unscientifically' only function within scientific world-views: chemists do 
not, as they should not, consider whether their procedures would be accept? 
able to an alchemist or an animist. Yet as long as alternative world-views 
which share the relevant concepts are considered, there will be a strong check 
on the objectivity of the theist's beliefs. 
XI 
This is not to endorse some version of fideism, on which faith is preeminent 
over reason, needing no epistemic justification, and indeed acting as the 
judge of reason. Rather, faith and reason form two mutually essential epi? 
stemic foundations for theism: a reasoned consideration of alternative world 
views and potential self-verification will make a leap of theistic faith rational. 
Once the commitment of faith is made, it is then possible to have religious 
experiences which can ( i ) serve as the grounds for basic theistic beliefs and 
(2) can yield evidence for further theistic beliefs providing further justi? 
fication for one's initial commitment. But as we have seen, faith will not be 
rational unless it meets trans-schema standards for what counts as warranted 
belief. In significant matters of faith, not just 'anything goes', and blind faith 
is no faith at all. 
Against this, it might be objected that one cannot judge one world-view, 
such as theism, in terms of another. For example, D. Z. Phillips holds that 
world-views are exclusionary, suggesting 'If a people lost their belief in God, 
belief in God is not 
"intelligible but false" for them, but unintelligible.'1 
But on this account, those who have never accepted theism would ipso facto 
find theism unintelligible. Yet surely atheists such as Voltaire, Jean-Paul 
Sartre, or Bretrand Russell can quite properly assess belief in God. So too, 
Thomist Trinitarians can quite properly assess Muslim monotheism, or to 
turn to a 
non-religious context, pre- and post-Copernican astronomers could 
sensibly discuss the heavens, though they disagreed about whether the 
heavens were immutable or not. This is possible because world-views are not 
exclusionary and isolated; though incompatible, they cannot be utterly 
incommensurate. Because world-views (and concepts) are social constructs, 
there not only are but must be general trans-schema canons of meaning 
1 D. Z. Phillips, Faith and Philosophical Enquiry, p. 46. Cf. Religion Without Explanation, p. 181. 
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fulness and justification, as well as specific shared concepts and beliefs, across 
world-views. 




about the nature of the universe. And part of what it is to hold the 'right 
view' is to hold a view that reasonable people with whom one does not 
currently agree could come to agree with. But any positive evaluation one 
might offer of one's own views about religion which is expected to have 
general credence presupposes the applicability of other world-views to the 
issues in question. It is not very interesting or persuasive to be told, upon 
asking the value of holding a particular world-view, that if one only con? 
verted to that view one would come to regard it as worthy. Further, any 
attempt to protect religion from external objections by claiming that world 
views are exclusionary would leave even the serious religious person either 
as a fanatical participant or an uncomprehending spectator vis-?-vis religion. 
For then there would be no way for the religious person both to remain 
religious and to assess the acceptability of their own world-view. Thus, views 
which treat religious world-views as conceptually isolated are inherently self 
stultifying. 
In this manner, a fundamental intuition of the evidentialist, that basic 
theistic beliefs should have some external support, is correct. And it explains 
why the evidentialist's position appears prima facie reasonable. Theistic truth 
claims, like any truth-claims, must be objective in that they are subject to 
trans-scYiemzi checking procedures of coherence, comprehensiveness, parsi? 
mony, and so on 
- 
general demands of rationality which are applied to all 
faith stances, whether religious, or political, or scientific. One can sensibly 
claim that one's most foundational beliefs are properly basic, that one has no 
further proof or reasons for these beliefs, but one cannot be rational and 
claim that it is irrelevant what others might say about the rationality of one's 
most foundational beliefs. 
xii 
Theism will be epistemically justified, and theistic beliefs properly basic, only 
if one has adequate grounds for initial commitment to a theistic world-view. 
However, as a potentially self-verifying genuine option, if theism is assessed 
against trans-schema criteria for warranted belief, theistic belief can be 
objective and the leap of faith adequately grounded. But this means that 
theism cannot be founded on argument or evidential certainty. Is this all we 
can say about the justification of theism? Where is the sort of absolute 
certainty which religious faith seems to require? Instead of a full-bodied 
religiosity, we seem to be left with an intellectualized notion of religious 
commitment. 
As the Duke of Wellington remarked upon being asked by a Russian 
diplomat whether Beethoven's bombastic Battle Symphony, the so-called 
'Wellington's Victory', resembled the real battle: 'By God, no,' he replied, 
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' 
if it had been, I should have run away myself. 
' 
If there is no more to religious 
commitment than being careful that one has violated no intellectual oblig? 
ations, it is hardly going to be persuasive. Yet just as programmatic music, 
no matter how skillful, does not replace its subject, religious epistemology 
does not replace religion. My concern in this paper has been to identify the 
proper epistemic grounds for theistic belief. And what we have raised here is 
a question about the other sense in which there are 'proper' grounds for 
religious belief, namely what would constitute religiously adequate reasons for 
belief. 
As children we were justified in simply holding the world-views and 
doxastic practices inculcated in us, because we had no adequate grounds for 
believing that those views and practices were not justified. As adults this is 
no longer sufficient, for we are in a position to consider alternative views, and 
we have become all too well acquainted with the shortcomings of our own 
views. Specifically regarding theism, there is an acute awareness today of the 
pluralism of the world religions and the sectarian pluralism within each 
world religion, Christian or Muslim or Hindu. And the informed theist is 
aware of atheological psychological and sociological analysis of theism as 
mere illusion, or a human projection, or a destructive addictive, that we find 
in Freud, Feuerbach, Marx, and others. Aside from these challenges, even 
inside the theological circle, the monotheist must confront the puzzles and 
perplexities of the notion of a transcendent God, the idea of the Incarnation, 
of life after death, and the presence of evil in this life. Two replies are in 
order. 
First, an epistemological point. The whole reason for having any world 
view and for attempting to achieve a better world-view, is to provide a 
unifying conception of the universe for present understanding and future 
action. Consequently, it will not only be natural but rational for the person 
of mature monotheistic faith to hold the fundamental suppositions of their 
world-view with utter commitment.1 Otherwise, our conceptions would be 
chaotic, and our actions paralyzed by indecisiveness. 
The second point concerns the role of values. Ultimately, we retain the 
world-views we do because our beliefs are confirmed by our own experience 
and the experience of others, and because they give meaning to our lives and 
help us fulfil our most fundamental goals. Thus we ultimately retain our 
world-views - whether monotheistic or naturalistic, Marxist or Capitalist 
- 
because of internal considerations about values. For, once epistemically 




1 An extended argument for this is given in Chapter 7 of Reason, Relativism and God. 
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